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Morse v. Frederick: Tinkering with School Speech:  
Can Five Years of Inconsistent Interpretation Yield a 
Hybrid Content–Effects-Based Approach to School 
Speech as a Tool for the Prevention of School Violence? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Ever since free public education became a core part of the American 
childhood experience, courts have been faced with the reality that 
educating children involves so much more than matters of curriculum. 
Because a large portion of a child’s time is spent at school, schools have 
become full-fledged societies unto themselves. By fostering multifaceted 
relationships and by joining many unique cultures and values, the school 
microcosm provides a particularly apt host to most of the difficulties 
inherent in any broader society. Among these difficulties is how to 
handle student speech that may be less than desirable, antisocial in 
nature, or outright violent in content. 
During the past five years, several dozen school shootings have 
occurred in the United States, many with fatalities.1 In response, school 
administrators have wrestled with an increasing number of school speech 
incidents centering on violent-themed student expression, appearing in 
writings, drawings, and clothing. In 2007, the Supreme Court held in 
Morse v. Frederick2 that schools may constitutionally regulate student 
speech deemed to promote use of illegal drugs. The holding was 
originally thought to be quite narrow in its scope, but lower courts have 
recognized the severe danger of continued school violence and have 
seized upon Morse—transforming its holding into a sweeping permission 
slip that allows school administrators to regulate student speech simply 
because it  
 
 
may indicate students’ violent intentions or even negative feelings 
 
 1. List of School Shootings, SCHOOLSHOOTING.ORG, http://web.archive.org/web/20 
100412080400/http://www.schoolshooting.org/attacks (last visited Aug. 27, 2012). 
 2. 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
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toward certain people.3 
School discipline has become a significant topic of national interest 
in recent years, attracting the attention of federal public health officials. 
Studies presented by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, for 
example, show that students, parents, administrators, and elected officials 
share a common concern over school violence.4 That concern has 
resulted in the emergence of numerous school-violence-prevention 
organizations, committees, and programs nationwide. Alexander Volokh 
and Lisa Snell note that the primary disciplinary issues in public schools 
in 1940 included talking out of turn, chewing gum, cutting in line, 
running in the hall, making noise, dressing inappropriately, and littering.5 
In 1990, by contrast, researchers found that those seemingly quaint 
problems of yesteryear had yielded to drug and alcohol abuse, suicide, 
teen pregnancy, rape, robbery, and assault.6 
Various policies have been developed by school districts to reduce 
violence-related issues in school. Some of these policies have been 
directed toward various forms of student expression. One of the most 
well-known examples is the recent emergence of restrictive dress codes. 
Though they certainly stifle student expression by limiting messages 
worn as part of one’s clothing, these dress codes have had only an 
arguable impact on decreasing violence.7 
The recent school shooting in Chardon, Ohio,8 with multiple 
fatalities, has provided a sadly tangible reminder that the legacy of 
Columbine is not ancient history, but rather a current danger to students 
throughout the country. It is against this backdrop of violent acts that 
courts have had to consider the application of First Amendment rights to 
student speech or expression. 
 
 3. See infra Part III.B. 
 4. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Youth Violence: Facts at a Glance 2010, 
CDC.GOV, http://www.cdc.gov/ViolencePrevention/pdf/YV-DataSheet-a.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 
2012). 
 5. ALEXANDER VOLOKH & LISA SNELL, SCHOOL VIOLENCE PREVENTION: STRATEGIES TO 
KEEP SCHOOLS SAFE (1998), available at http://reason.org/files/ 
60b57eac352e529771bfa27d7d736d3f.pdf. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Kathleen L. Paliokas, Challenges Facing Our Schools: Four Policy Perspectives: Dress 
Codes as a Means of Reducing Violence in Public Schools, INST. FOR EDUC. STUDIES, 
http://www.edstudies.net/files/active/0/resources-challenges.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2012). 
 8. Jess Bidgood & Sabrina Tavernise, School Shooting in Ohio Leaves 1 Dead and 4 
Wounded, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/28/us/fatal-school-
shooting-in-chardon-ohio-suspect-is-arrested.html?_r=2. 
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Five years ago, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in the most 
recent landmark case related to school speech, Morse v. Frederick.9 
Morse carved out a new content-based category of speech that can be 
constitutionally regulated by school administrators. The Court held that 
schools may regulate speech that can be reasonably interpreted as 
promoting illegal drug use.10 This opinion, however, was qualified by a 
concurrence by two Justices—one of whom was the deciding vote—
which purports to limit the holding to apply only to speech that occurs at 
school and that can be reasonably interpreted as promoting illegal drug 
use. The concurrence also asserted that speech related to political or 
social issues, including the war on drugs, cannot be constitutionally 
restricted.11  
Despite this seemingly narrow holding, lower courts have since 
relied upon Morse to restrict non-drug-use-promoting speech that may be 
interpreted as having the possibility of leading to physical harm, based 
upon a school administrator’s analysis of the content of the speech. If 
Morse’s holding continues to open the door wider to more restrictions on 
school speech, the question should be asked: can Morse’s content-based 
test be applied so as to cover more than drug-promoting speech without 
doing severe violence to the First Amendment?  
Part II.A of this Comment first reviews pre-Morse constitutional 
restrictions on school speech based upon the three-part canon of 
landmark school-speech cases: Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District,12 Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,13 
and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.14 Part II.B then explains 
how Morse has added to the constitutional school-speech doctrine. Part 
III discusses the actual interpretation and application of Morse by lower 
courts in the past half-decade since the decision, particularly 
demonstrating how federal circuit courts, federal district courts, and state 
courts are split in their readings of the scope of Morse’s holding. Part IV 
suggests that the Morse holding—while possibly being seen as a threat to 
traditionally protected areas of speech—if construed moderately, can be 
a useful tool for school administrators without significantly altering the 
 
 9. 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 10. Id. at 409–10. 
 11. Id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 12. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 13. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 14. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
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state of school speech jurisprudence going forward. Specifically, 
administrators can look to Morse for guidance in dealing with instances 
of school speech that can be interpreted as promoting violence or 
otherwise negatively impacting significant areas of concern in modern 
schools. In so doing, administrators can interpret Morse’s content-based 
speech exception through a lens of an effects-based test,15 without 
harming students’ legitimate speech interests. Finally, this Comment 
suggests that courts, in their application of Morse, must heed the 
concurrence’s caveat as to political speech and focus on protecting the 
rights of other students as Tinker explicitly allows.16 
II. SCHOOL SPEECH BACKGROUND 
A. The Traditional School Speech Canon 
In 1969, amidst the contentious two-decade-long Vietnam conflict, 
the Court considered whether school administrators could ban students 
from wearing black armbands as a silent but visible protest of U.S. 
involvement in the war in Southeast Asia. As the Court famously noted 
in Tinker, “It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed 
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate.”17 Accordingly, the Court established the gold 
standard of school speech jurisprudence: namely, that the First 
Amendment, through the Fourteenth Amendment, required that, “[i]n 
order for the State in the person of school officials to justify prohibition 
of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its 
action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the 
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular 
viewpoint.”18 Quoting Justice Brennan from an earlier case, the Tinker 
Court continued: 
“[V]igilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital 
than in the community of American schools.” The classroom is 
peculiarly the “marketplace of ideas.” The Nation’s future depends 
 
 15. Similar to how the Court in Fraser, 478 U.S. at 675, applied the decades-old lewdness-
and-obscenity standard to the new area of school speech, the classic fighting-words exception to the 
First Amendment could likewise be applied in a school context without contravening accepted First 
Amendment protections and exclusions. 
 16. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508. 
 17. Id. at 506. 
 18. Id. at 509. 
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upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of 
ideas which discovers truth “out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than 
through any kind of authoritative selection.”19 
With this appreciation for an ideal school culture that promotes the 
free exchange of ideas between students, the Court rejected any notion 
that the purpose of schools is to train students to be homogenous 
automatons, all engaged in assimilating and regurgitating an officially 
sanctioned viewpoint. 
The Tinker Court, therefore, adopted an effects-based test. The 
Tinker test focused on what the speech itself might provoke in the midst 
of a great and emotional controversy. This is in contrast to a content-
based test, which would look solely to the actual speech itself, 
irrespective of how it is perceived, received, or interpreted by an 
audience.20 The Court held that the school administrators must 
demonstrate with sufficient evidence that their restrictions were 
“necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with 
schoolwork or discipline”21 or the rights of other students22 in order to 
pass the constitutionality test. In the 1986 decision of Bethel School 
District No. 403 v. Fraser,23 the Court clarified that the First 
Amendment, through the Fourteenth Amendment, allows for a hybrid 
content–effects test to be applied when regulating school speech. That is, 
a school’s interest in maintaining an atmosphere free of disruptive 
behavior allows an effects-based analysis to be applied to the content of 
speech if such speech is lewd or indecent. In Fraser, school 
administrators disciplined a student for violating an anti-obscenity rule 
when, during a school-sponsored assembly, he gave a nomination speech 
filled with “elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor[s]”24 that 
were thinly veiled, if at all, in the cloak of supposedly extolling the 
 
 19. Id. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (alteration in 
original) (citations omitted)). 
 20. Purely content-based regulation of generally protected areas of speech (e.g., speech that 
is not obscene or does not involve fighting words) is analyzed under strict scrutiny and is 
presumptively unconstitutional. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 
455 (1980). Morse purports to answer how content-based regulations on speech may be applied in 
the school context, a setting in which speech rights differ from those protected by general First 
Amendment jurisprudence, as this Comment discusses throughout. 
 21. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511. 
 22. Id. at 508. 
 23. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 24. Id. at 678. 
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virtues of a student government candidate. Given the long-accepted 
conclusion that the First Amendment does not explicitly protect vulgar or 
lewd speech,25 the Fraser Court duly noted that the First Amendment 
admits of only very limited content restrictions. But the premise for such 
restrictions is that lewd or indecent speech occurring in a school-
sponsored forum is deemed not to be an “essential part of any exposition 
of ideas, and [is] of such slight social value as a step to truth that any 
benefit that may be derived from [such speech] is clearly outweighed by 
the social interest in order and morality.”26 Thus, despite the extensive 
ban on content restrictions, “it was perfectly appropriate for the school to 
disassociate itself [from the speech] to make the point to the pupils that 
vulgar speech and lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent with the 
‘fundamental values’ of public school education”27 because a school’s 
primary concern is carrying out its “basic educational mission.”28 In 
coming to this conclusion, the Court emphasized that the negative effects 
of the student’s speech were many. In particular, the Court noted that in 
the presence of an audience including children as young as fourteen 
years old, some students “graphically simulated the sexual act[s]” 
described by the speaker; other students expressed embarrassment or 
bewilderment. And, the next day, one teacher had to forgo teaching her 
lesson “in order to discuss the speech with [her] class.”29 Thus, as 
applied, Fraser demonstrates that the Court  
 
was still weighing the validity of school speech restrictions primarily 
against the effects of student speech.30 
The final case in the traditional school speech canon further refined 
the doctrine, again applying an effects-based test and extending Fraser’s 
interest in allowing schools to regulate certain speech in school-
sponsored contexts. In 1988, in the case of Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier,31 the Court held that if speech can reasonably be viewed as 
bearing the school’s imprimatur, it may be regulated by the school where 
 
 25. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
 26. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572). 
 27. Id. at 685–86. 
 28. Id. at 685. 
 29. Id. at 678. 
 30. Both Tinker and Fraser foreshadow the Court’s decision in Morse, which was based on 
the anticipated effects of the speech at issue. 
 31. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
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such speech is connected to “lessons [an] activity is designed to teach.”32 
In Kuhlmeier, two student-written articles intended for publication in the 
school-sponsored student newspaper were rejected for publication by the 
principal. One article, detailing the experiences of three pregnant 
students, was rejected on concerns that the article would undermine the 
anonymity and privacy of the pregnant students and their loved ones, in 
addition to concerns about the potentially negative effects of “frank talk” 
regarding sexual experiences and birth control.33 The principal, whose 
responsibilities included reviewing student-written material, deemed 
these articles “inappropriate [for] a school-sponsored publication 
distributed to 14-year-old freshmen and presumably taken home to be 
read by students’ even younger brothers and sisters.”34 The principal also 
objected to another article, which dealt with the impact of divorce on 
students at the school, again based on student and family privacy 
concerns and “matter[s] of journalistic fairness.”35 
The Court held that the principal was reasonable in his decision not 
to allow publication of the articles “under the circumstances as he 
understood them,” which included a conclusion that the student writers 
had “not sufficiently mastered those portions of the . . . curriculum that 
pertained to the treatment of controversial issues and personal attacks, 
the need to protect the privacy of individuals . . . , and ‘the legal, moral, 
and ethical restrictions imposed upon journalists within [a] school 
community.’”36 The Court went on to hold that where “expressive 
activities . . . might reasonably [be] perceive[d] to bear the imprimatur of 
the school,”37 educators are entitled to exercise control to the extent 
necessary to ensure that less mature audiences are not exposed to 
inappropriate material and to further ensure that such expression is not 
“erroneously attributed” as being an official view of the school.38 The 
Court noted that this is a flexible standard which can take into account 
 
 32. Id. at 271. 
 33. Id. at 274. 
 34. Id. at 274–75. 
 35. Id. at 275. 
 36. Id. at 276. 
 37. The Court noted that such would be the case where “activities may fairly be characterized 
as part of the school curriculum” regardless of whether they “occur in a traditional classroom 
setting.” Id. at 271. In other words, “so long as [the activities] are supervised by faculty members 
and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences,” they 
will be considered part of the school curriculum. Id. 
 38. Id. 
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the emotional maturity of the students39 but that schools must 
nevertheless retain the right to “refuse to sponsor student speech that 
might reasonably be perceived to advocate drug or alcohol use, 
irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise inconsistent with ‘the shared 
values of a civilized social order.’”40  
Thus, when the effects of school speech include the impression (or 
reality) of school-sponsorship as well as concerns about the speech’s 
impact on legitimate pedagogical goals, school administrators are to be 
given extensive latitude in their regulation of such expression. 
B. Enter Morse 
Against this backdrop, the school speech canon expanded in 2007 to 
include a fourth major case: Morse v. Frederick.41 In 2002, Joseph 
Frederick and several friends held a large homemade banner bearing the 
cryptic phrase “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” while watching the Olympic 
Torch Relay pass their high school in Juneau, Alaska.42 Frederick 
admitted to having no substantive purpose in displaying the banner: he 
simply wanted to get on television and figured a banner with a nonsense 
slogan would attract the attention of television cameras.43 He succeeded 
in getting in front of the cameras as well as attracting the attention of his 
school principal, Deborah Morse, who promptly required him to take 
down the banner.44 As a result of the incident, Frederick was suspended 
from school.45 He then sued Morse and the school district for violation 
of his First Amendment rights.46 
The Morse Court first concluded that because the speech occurred 
“at school,” its analysis should be governed by school speech law rather 
than traditional First Amendment guidelines.47 The Court emphasized 
that the students had displayed the banner in the midst of fellow students 
and that this event took place during school hours while the students 
 
 39. Id. at 272. 
 40. Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)). 
 41. 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 42. Id. at 397. 
 43. Id. at 397, 399, 401. 
 44. Id. at 398. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 399. 
 47. Id. at 401. 
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were on supervised release from classes;48 In essence, for legal purposes, 
the students were on a field trip across the street from the school.49 Once 
it determined that this case fell within the ambit of school speech 
jurisprudence, the Court then held that school administrators could 
constitutionally forbid the display of the arguably nonsensical banner.50 
The basis for prohibiting Frederick’s banner was that its message could 
reasonably be construed as promoting illegal drug use among students.51 
In explaining what seemed to be a departure from Tinker, the Court 
clarified that “the mode of analysis set forth in Tinker is not absolute” 
(due to exceptions that were permitted in Fraser and Kuhlmeier).52 That 
is, an exception to Tinker could be justified by the “important—indeed, 
perhaps compelling interest” of preventing drug abuse by 
schoolchildren.53 For further support of this new content-based (but 
effects-considering) rule, the Court drew an analogy between the Fraser 
decision and the facts in Morse, noting that the “mode of analysis” in 
Fraser was less than entirely clear and that the Fraser Court certainly 
had considered the content of the speech in question. Thus, the Morse 
Court drew distinctions between the banner, protected political speech 
(the children’s armbands in Tinker), and the sexually graphic remarks 
offered by the young Mr. Fraser in his school assembly.54 
It has been argued that even though the Morse Court created a new 
exception to Tinker based on speech that advocates drug use, it failed to 
correctly apply this new standard to the actual facts in Morse, because 
Frederick’s banner plausibly could have been considered political in 
nature.55 Commentators argue that this distinction should have provided 
Frederick’s speech with greater protection, because political speech is 
widely considered the most protected class of speech under the First 
Amendment.56 Justice Stevens himself noted, in his Morse dissent, that 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 400–01. 
 50. Id. at 403. 
 51. Id. at 401. 
 52. Id. at 405. 
 53. Id. at 407 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Kellie A. Cairns, Morse v. Frederick: Evaluating a Supreme Hit to Students’ First 
Amendment Rights, 29 PACE L. REV. 151, 167 (2008). 
 56. Id. See also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 
(1995) (“Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination. The 
government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the 
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“[t]he Court’s opinion ignores the fact that the legalization of marijuana 
is an issue of considerable public concern in Alaska.”57 Indeed, the Court 
in Tinker, the landmark school speech case, dealt with students engaged 
in clearly political speech and fiercely guarded their right to do so.58 
Nevertheless, As Part III of this Comment will demonstrate,59 other 
courts’ considerations of student speech have ignored the potentially 
political nature of some incidents of speech in adopting a Morse-like 
analysis. For present purposes, however, at least one court, relying on 
Morse for guidance, has lent credence to the argument that that 
separating out the “political” content of multifaceted speech for special 
protection is secondary to considering the potential effects such speech 
can have on the student body. In thus looking past the political 
characteristics student speech, it seems that Morse could potentially be 
construed to allow schools to ignore that distinction altogether and 
simply ban words that might be interpreted as promoting drug use, so 
 
opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.”); Tinker v. Des Moines 
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505–06, 508 (1969). 
 57. Morse, 551 U.S. at 445 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Alaskans have decriminalized 
marijuana (by a state supreme court ruling), recriminalized it, decriminalized it for medicinal 
purposes, and, in 2000, considered and rejected (by a 59% to 41% vote) a very broad cannabis 
decriminalization and amnesty ballot measure. Following the rejection of that measure, and 
contemporaneous to Frederick’s display of the “Bong Hits” banner, an initiative posing a simpler 
question of marijuana decriminalization was going through the steps to be certified for the 2004 
general election ballot. Against this factual background of intense public interest in marijuana laws 
in Alaska, it is not unreasonable to suggest that this political undercurrent in some way shaped or 
was at least implicated in the message of Frederick’s banner or its perception by people who viewed 
it. Based on a plausible interpretation of the banner as having a political message, commentators 
have argued that the long-running statewide debate about marijuana legalization certainly should 
have been considered by the Court as a context within which to evaluate the speech and that Morse 
has gone too far by now permitting viewpoint discrimination. While it is beyond the scope of this 
footnote to more than briefly mention the see-saw state of marijuana laws in Alaska, the purpose of 
this brief review is to highlight a possible interpretation that, as Justice Stevens stated in his dissent 
in Morse, intense local interest in a subject should be considered as to the possible political meaning 
of a student’s speech activities. Id. 
 58. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511 (“In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of 
totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students. Students in 
school as well as out of school are ‘persons’ under our Constitution. They are possessed of 
fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect their 
obligations to the State. In our system, students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of 
only that which the State chooses to communicate. They may not be confined to the expression of 
those sentiments that are officially approved. In the absence of a specific showing of constitutionally 
valid reasons to regulate their speech, students are entitled to freedom of expression of their 
views.”). 
 59. See infra Part III. 
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long as a court correctly applies an effects-based analysis. 
Based in part on some concerns about potentially eroding the right to 
political speech in schools—especially concerning current and 
contentious issues—the opinions of the Justices on the Morse Court were 
by no means completely unified. In the 5–4 decision, two of the Justices 
in the majority—Justice Alito, joined by Justice Kennedy—stated in a 
concurring opinion: 
[We] join the opinion of the Court on the understanding that (1) it goes 
no further than to hold that a public school may restrict speech that a 
reasonable observer would interpret as advocating illegal drug use and 
(2) it provides no support for any restriction of speech that can 
plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social issue, 
including speech on issues such as “the wisdom of the war on drugs or 
of legalizing marijuana for medicinal use.”60  
 
It is worth noting that Justice Alito based his support for the new rule 
on the theory that schools “can be places of special danger” and that 
drugs pose a “serious” threat to students’ physical safety.61  
Justice Alito also expressed the opinion that there are not necessarily 
any grounds for regulation of drug-related speech “that are not already 
recognized” by the Court’s previous holdings, including Tinker, Fraser, 
and Kuhlmeier.62 
Without Justices Alito’s and Kennedy’s limited support, including 
Justice Alito’s deciding vote, the majority would have been a distinct 
minority, one of whose members (Justice Thomas) joined the majority 
explicitly for the opportunity to contribute to the erosion of Tinker, and 
who—perhaps radically—argued that the Morse case should have been 
seized as an opportunity to completely overrule Tinker.63 Dissenting in 
Morse, Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, contend that the Court 
did “serious violence to the First Amendment” based only on an “oblique 
reference to drugs,” arguing that “[t]he First Amendment demands more, 
indeed, much more.”64 
 
 60. Morse, 551 U.S. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 61. Id. at 424–25. 
 62. Id. at 422–23. 
 63. Id. at 421 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 64. Id. at 434–35 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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III. DECODING MORSE 
It has been argued that application of this new content-
based-exception standard is in the process of swallowing up Tinker.65 
Several cases over the years since Morse indicate that courts are now 
willing to use the decision in Morse to give greater deference to school 
administrators.66 The previous constitutional bases for allowing 
administrators to regulate school speech included a concern for actual 
school goals such as discipline and others’ rights,67 interest in 
maintaining an educational environment free of disruptive behavior,68 
and the pursuit of legitimate pedagogical concerns.69 Courts since Morse 
have determined that deference to school authorities can now be given 
based on something wider—but how much wider varies from court to 
court. 
Lower courts are sharply divided over the breadth of the Morse 
holding, with much of the confusion ensuing shortly after the issuance of 
the Morse opinion. For example, among those reading Morse narrowly, 
the federal district court in New Jersey applied the standard very strictly 
in 2007, having read Morse not to change the Tinker standard of analysis, 
but rather to have created a new exception to Tinker.70 In 2011, the Third 
Circuit concluded that Morse applied solely to drug-related speech 
occurring at school when it affirmed the western Pennsylvania federal 
district court’s similar holding in 2007.71 Additionally, a 2007 Sixth 
Circuit concurring opinion, Lowery v. Euverard,72 read Morse narrowly 
and quickly dismissed it as not controlling. The case at hand was non-
drug-related and involved student disruptions to a high school football 
team.73 The concurring circuit judge read Morse as not having 
“overrule[d] or otherwise alter[ed] Tinker.”74 
Conversely, a significant number of courts have interpreted Morse to 
 
 65. See Piotr Banasiak, Morse v. Frederick: Why Content-Based Exceptions, Deference, and 
Confusion Are Swallowing Tinker, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 1059 (2009). 
 66. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 67. See Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 68. See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 69. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1987). 
 70. DePinto v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 514 F. Supp. 2d 633, 639 (D.N.J. 2007). 
 71. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 72. 497 F.3d 584, 601 (6th Cir. 2007) (Gilman, J., concurring). 
 73. Id. at 585–86 (majority opinion). 
 74. Id. at 601 (Gilman, J., concurring). 
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allow for a new class of exceptions to school speech based on the need to 
take threats of school violence seriously in a post-Columbine world75 or 
on the basis of protecting students from psychological harm76. One thing 
is clear, even if Morse is not: there is widespread disagreement on what 
Morse means and how it should be applied, or even to which school 
speech cases it should be applied. 
A. Narrow Readings of Morse 
The narrowest application of Morse is that it allows school 
administrators to ban student speech that occurs at school and that  
 
 
can be reasonably interpreted to promote drug use among students.77 
In DePinto v. Bayonne Board of Education,78 the U.S. District Court 
for the District of New Jersey held, shortly after Morse entered the scene, 
that Morse did not change the “basic framework, or the applicable 
analyses,”79 where the three recognized varieties of school speech are 
concerned, namely, “(1) vulgar, lewd, obscene, and plainly offensive 
speech, (2) school-sponsored speech, and (3) speech that falls into 
neither of these categories.”80 Because the district court saw Morse as 
not modifying the accepted types of analysis, it recognized Morse as a 
new entrant into the school-speech canon, but did not consider the Morse 
holding broad enough to apply to the facts in DePinto, which concerned 
fifth-grade students who, as a protest of their school’s uniform policy, 
distributed and wore buttons featuring photographs of the Hitler Youth in 
uniform.81 Relying on precedent from the Third Circuit, the DePinto 
court noted that Tinker required a “specific and significant fear of 
disruption, not just some remote apprehension of a disturbance.”82 The 
district court also noted that Morse refused to consider Frederick’s 
banner under the Fraser “plainly offensive” standard.83 In recognizing 
 
 75. See discussion infra Part III.B.1. 
 76. See discussion infra Part III.B.2. 
 77. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007). 
 78. 514 F. Supp. 2d 633 (D.N.J. 2007). 
 79. Id. at 639. 
 80. Id. (quoting Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
 81. Id. at 636. 
 82. Id. at 637 (quoting Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 211 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
 83. Id. at 640 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)). 
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the limits of “plainly offensive” as understood by Morse, and by 
applying the Tinker standard, the court allowed the children to wear the 
buttons to school, finding that the school administration had failed to 
demonstrate that the buttons comparing school uniforms to Hitler Youth 
had either interfered with the work of the school, caused a disruption or 
substantial fear thereof, interfered with school discipline, or infringed on 
the rights of other students.84 
 
Further support for a narrow reading of Morse came when the Third 
Circuit affirmed a district court’s holding that Morse applies only to 
drug-related speech in a school context.85 In Layshock v. Hermitage 
School District, the Third Circuit considered the case of a high school 
senior who had used a computer at his grandmother’s home to create a 
fake MySpace profile about his school principal.86 While the parody 
profile boasted of the principal’s affinity for drugs, including steroids, 
marijuana, “pills,” and alcohol,87 the court noted that Morse held only 
that the First Amendment does not prevent school administrators from 
“restrict[ing] student speech at a school event, when that speech is 
reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use,”88 and stated, 
therefore, that “[i]t would be an unseemly and dangerous precedent to 
allow the state, in the guise of school authorities, to reach into a child’s 
home and control his/her actions there to the same extent that it can 
control that child when he/she participates in school sponsored 
activities.”89 Having dispensed with Morse as a means of dealing with 
the demeaning speech about the principal, the Third Circuit instead 
analyzed the facts under other precedent that disallowed punishment 
simply because the offensive speech reached into the school, though it 
had not happened at school.90 
Similarly, a concurring opinion in the case of Lowery v. Euverard, 
cited Justice Alito’s concurrence in Morse, stating that the then-new 
Morse ruling did not hold that there were “necessarily any grounds for 
such regulation that are not already recognized in the holdings of [the] 
 
 84. Id. at 650. 
 85. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 86. Id. at 207–08. 
 87. Id. at 208. 
 88. Id. at 216 (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007)). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 216–19. 
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Court.”91 The same opinion further noted that “the Supreme Court 
recently had an opportunity to overrule or otherwise alter Tinker, but 
explicitly declined to do so in a way that would affect the outcome” in 
the non-drug-related case in Lowery.92 
B. Broad Readings of Morse 
Both DePinto and Layshock stand, in their respective jurisdictions, 
for the proposition that Morse is to be read narrowly. Specifically, they 
held that Morse either did not alter the classic standard from Tinker or 
did not extend to drug-related speech that occurs anywhere other than “at 
school” as that term has been defined.93 As this section will describe, 
other courts, have taken a broader view of Morse, particularly as applied 
to speech that plausibly can be viewed as either menacing or as a serious 
threat of violence or other harm to school personnel or students.94 The 
Court’s opinion in Morse refers to the danger of students using drugs 
being “far more serious and palpable” than the “discomfort and 
unpleasantness” that Tinker mentioned as associated with the expression 
of unpopular views.95 As part of its justification for the new rule, Morse 
also referred to myriad congressional and school board policies 
nationwide that either prohibit drugs in schools or require curricula 
designed to combat drug usage.96 The suggestion is that new, developing 
problems in schools can and should be addressed by school 
administrators, who can look to the courts for support in dealing with 
these problems. Taking a cue from the Court on how new exceptions to 
Tinker can be created, a number of lower courts have followed suit and 
relied upon the Morse decision to permit regulation of speech related to 
threats of specific acts of physical violence, violent acts that are illegal, 
and speech that may possibly be psychologically harmful to students. 
 
 91. Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 603 (6th Cir. 2007) (Gilman, J., concurring) (quoting 
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 422 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring)). 
 92. Id. at 601. 
 93. See Depinto v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 514 F. Supp. 2d 633, 639–40 (D.N.J. 2007); see 
also Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 221 n.3 (3d Cir. 2011). 
  
 95. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408 (2007). 
 96. Id. 
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1. Speech that threatens physical violence or harm 
In Boim v. Fulton County School District, the Eleventh Circuit 
considered the case of a high school student who was expelled from 
school after a teacher confiscated her notebook.97 The notebook’s 
contents consisted of the student’s written thoughts about what she 
claimed was a daydream in which she brought a gun to school and shot 
her math teacher.98 With school officials concerned that the description 
of the violent act was actually a plan disguised as a dream, the student 
was suspended and ultimately expelled from school on the basis of 
school rules against threats of harm to others.99 Rejecting the student’s 
argument that the notes about her dream were protected speech under the 
First Amendment, the court referred to Morse for support.100 Noting that 
“[t]he special characteristics of the school environment and the 
governmental interest in stopping student drug abuse . . . allow schools to 
restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as promoting 
illegal drug use,’” the court determined that the “same rationale applies 
equally, if not more strongly, to speech reasonably construed as a threat 
of school violence.”101 
 As support for this expanded reading of Morse, the court’s opinion 
recited a list of several school shootings that had occurred within close 
proximity of the concerned high school and within a time frame of only 
several years.102 
 The court further compared the student’s violent notes to yelling 
“fire” in a crowded theater or knowingly making false comments about 
the presence of a bomb on an aircraft, both of which are examples of 
speech for which there is no First Amendment protection.103 As in those 
examples, the student created an “appreciable risk” of disruption that 
 
 97. Boim v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 980 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 98. Id. at 980–81. 
 99. Id. at 981–82. 
 100. Id. at 984. 
 101. Id. (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408 (2007)). 
 102. Id. at 983–84. It might be concluded from this that courts are willing to take local 
conditions, history, and feelings into consideration when deciding tough cases of school speech. As 
this Comment suggests in the next part, the ability to rely on Morse to support anti-violence school 
speech policies is the primary benefit to be derived from that holding, and this interpretation has the 
potential to help prevent incidents of school violence in the future when potential incidents of 
violence are precipitated by hints such as notes or other writings by students or a state of heightened 
vigilance based on general local conditions such as past violence. 
 103. Id. at 984. 
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goes beyond “mere speculation or paranoia.”104 By bringing the 
notebook to school, where there was a “certainty” of it being seen by 
others, the student gave administrators sufficient reason to act in an 
appropriate manner, as the interest in a school free of gun violence was 
significantly greater than the Tinker test of avoiding “discomfort and 
unpleasantness” related to a particular viewpoint.105 Consequently, the 
school was justified in its actions to punish the student.106 
Having seen the purportedly narrow Morse holding expanded to 
include palpable, written threats of immediate violence, we turn now to a 
similar view expressed by the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit looked 
directly to Morse for guidance in deciding Ponce v. Socorro Independent 
School District and found support for extending the breadth of the Morse 
holding.107 In Ponce, the court was tasked with deciding the case of a 
high school sophomore in Texas who had been disciplined and placed in 
a special education program after showing several classmates an 
“extended notebook diary, written in the first-person perspective.”108 
The student had written about a leading group of pseudo-Nazi students 
operating in his school and other schools throughout his district.109 The 
notebook contained the author’s plans to command his group “‘to 
brutally injure two homosexuals and seven colored’ people” and to harm 
“another student by setting his house on fire and ‘brutally murder[ing]’ 
his dog.”110 The notebook also contained plans for a “[C]olumbine 
shooting” at the author’s school or a “coordinated ‘shooting at all the 
[district’s] schools at the same time.’”111 The student also wrote that he 
felt his anger had gotten the best of him and that he was soon to reach the 
point where he would lose all control.112 He also gave a specific date on 
which the shootings would occur.113 
As did the Eleventh Circuit in Boim, the Fifth Circuit referred to 
several well-known school shooting incidents and stated that “recent 
 
 104. Id. at 985. 
 105. Id.; see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969). 
 106. Id. 
 107. 508 F.3d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 108. Id. at 766. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. (alteration in original). 
 111. Id. (alteration in original). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
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history demonstrates that threats of an attack on a school and its students 
must be taken seriously.”114 The court reasoned that if Morse could find 
in favor of regulating speech where it concerns harm that might come 
from students using illegal drugs, “it defies logical extrapolation to hold 
school administrators to a stricter standard with respect to speech that 
gravely and uniquely threatens violence, including massive deaths, to the 
school population as a whole.”115 
The Ponce court suggests that Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in 
Morse should control, citing two primary purposes in the concurrence: 
“providing specificity to the rule announced by the majority opinion, 
and, relatedly, ensuring that political speech will remain protected within 
the school setting.”116 Rather than reading Justice Alito’s opinion as 
narrowing the scope of Morse, the Fifth Circuit read it as providing 
greater clarity to the majority and providing the most specific reasoning 
for the holding in Morse.117 The Fifth Circuit was particularly persuaded 
by Justice Alito’s statement that: 
The special characteristic that is relevant in this case is the threat to the 
physical safety of students. School attendance can expose students to 
threats to their physical safety that they would not otherwise face. 
Outside of school, parents can attempt to protect their children in many 
ways and may take steps to monitor and exercise control over the 
persons with whom their children associate. Similarly, students, when 
not in school, may be able to avoid threatening individuals and 
situations. During school hours, however, parents are not present to 
provide protection and guidance, and students’ movements and their 
ability to choose the persons with whom they spend time are severely 
restricted. Students may be compelled on a daily basis to spend time at 
close quarters with other students who may do them harm. Experience 
shows that schools can be places of special danger.118 
Presuming that the Supreme Court’s goal in Morse was to allow 
school administrators to regulate speech that might threaten the physical 
safety of students, the court declared that speech is unprotected by the 
First Amendment when it advocates “demonstrably grave” harms that 
derive their gravity from the “special danger” discussed by Justice 
 
 114. Id. at 771. 
 115. Id. at 772. 
 116. Id. at 768. 
 117. Id. at 769–70. 
 118. Id. at 770 (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 422 (2007)). 
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Alito.119 As did Boim, the Ponce court compared the specific threats 
contained in the student’s writing to the axiomatic yelling of “fire” in a 
crowded theater and found the student’s threats to be far worse. The 
court held that where threats of physical violence to students are found to 
exist, school administrators must be able to “react quickly and 
decisively.”120 
Several lower courts, and even some outside the Fifth Circuit, have 
cited Ponce. For example, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania 
looked to Ponce when an eighth-grade student prepared several lists 
containing dozens of classmates’ names under titles such as “People to 
Kill!” and “People I Need to Kill.”121  
Additionally, the Southern District of New York looked to Ponce for 
support when it ruled in the case of a third-grade student who had 
completed many drawings and writing assignments expressing a desire to 
kill other students through various violent and gruesome means and who 
had wished that he could “[b]low up the school with the teachers in 
it.”122 
It is not only K-12 education that has been affected. A west Texas 
federal district court cited Ponce when it found in favor of allowing 
regulation of similar speech in a public community college 
environment.123 In the Texas case, a female student wrote that 
“[s]tudents do not throw toilet paper into trees or soap up windows 
anymore. They pull weapons out of backpacks.”124 She went on to say 
that she herself was capable of employing an “outrageous display of 
force” to obtain relief from a professor who was perceived as stifling her 
views in the classroom,125 and that the she was willing to “shoot [the 
professor] dead” if she could do so without being prosecuted for 
murder.126 
The relatively frequent need for courts to deal with matters regarding 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 772. 
 121. See Jones v. Gateway Sch. Dist., 2010 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 133, at *2 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. Mar. 26, 2010). 
 122. See Cuff v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 714 F. Supp. 2d 462, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 123. O’Neal v. Alamo Cmty. Coll. Dist., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6637, at *39–*40, *44 (W.D. 
Tex. Jan. 27, 2010). 
 124. Id. at *4. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at *5. 
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student speech featuring violence with such great specificity would 
suggest that the Boim and Ponce courts were aware of recent incidents 
and considered the possibility of copycat acts of violence by students 
who could be influenced by what they hear about to plan or carry out 
extremely dangerous acts. It is certainly understandable why courts 
would read Morse in a way that could facilitate preventative measures. 
But Morse has also been employed to restrict less specific student 
speech where violent messages are at issue but do not include particular 
threats toward a school or its students. In 2008, in Miller v. Penn Manor 
School District,127 the court concluded that “a substantial interest resides 
in public schools to discourage violence both in the school setting as well 
as in the community at large as part of the district’s overall educational 
mission.”128 Miller was a ninth-grade student who had been disciplined 
for wearing a t-shirt featuring images of an automatic handgun on the 
front and back and the words “Special Issue–Resident–Lifetime License, 
United States Terrorist Hunting Permit, Permit No. 91101, Gun Owner–
No Bag Limit” on the back.129 Miller argued that his speech was 
political in nature and, additionally, was a legitimate expression of 
support for his uncle, who had bought him the shirt and was, at that time, 
stationed in Iraq with the U.S. Army.130 As in Morse, the court chose to 
disregard the possibly political connotations of the speech and evaluated 
the speech based on its effect on other students.131 Whatever Miller’s 
motive may have been (political, emotional, or otherwise), a teacher 
acted on a complaint from another student who was made uncomfortable 
by the shirt.132 After the teacher expressed her concerns to Miller that the 
shirt could be “frightening” to other students because of past incidents of 
gun violence in schools and that the “shirt’s message promoted the 
hunting and killing of human beings,”133 she met with the principal to 
 
 127. 588 F. Supp. 2d 606 (E.D. Pa. 2008). 
 128. Id. at 627. 
 129. Id. at 611. 
 130. Id. at 618. 
 131. Id. at 625. Recall that while Frederick never argued that his “BONG HiTS” banner was 
political speech, Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in Morse considered the possible political 
interpretation important enough to mention. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 422 (2007) (Alito, J., 
concurring). Here, in Miller, the court chooses to disregard not only the possible interpretation of the 
shirt as a political message but also the explicit argument of the plaintiff that his speech is protected 
due to its political nature. Miller, 588 F. Supp.2d at 625. 
 132. Miller, 588 F. Supp. 2d at 611. 
 133. Id. 
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discuss the shirt.134 Miller was eventually disciplined by school 
administrators for violating a school policy related to his wearing of the 
shirt, on the basis that the shirt promoted violence.135 
The court applied Morse by noting that it is not the motive of the 
speaker (here, the wearer) that matters as much as the interpretation of 
the message by others.136 Mr. Frederick’s non-political, non-drug-
promoting intentions with his “BONG HiTS” banner (recall that he only 
wanted to get attention from television cameras and that he had no real 
message he was trying to communicate) could not overcome the Court’s 
conclusion that the principal in Morse was reasonable in concluding that 
the banner’s slogan promoted the use of illegal drugs.137 Similarly, in 
Miller, the classmate, teacher, and principal were justified by the court in 
interpreting the terrorist-hunting t-shirt as fearful, uncomfortable, and 
promoting the illegal vigilante killing of human beings.138 The court 
noted that the “motive does not dismiss as meaningless” a message that 
is inappropriate for the school environment.139 These cases demonstrate 
that, rather than focusing on an actor’s motivation, courts are primarily 
interested in the content or effects of the actor’s speech activities. This is 
important in that explicitly violent speech that a student claims is merely 
a fictional writing may still be regulated despite the claimed fictional 
nature of the material. 
The Miller court said, “The impact of violence in schools is so great 
that it now has equal importance as the issue of illegal drug use in 
schools.”140 Citing the same paragraph of Justice Alito’s concurrence as 
Ponce, the court concluded that “speech that promotes illegal behavior” 
may be regulated and that the threat of violence and safety concerns in 
our schools are of the “utmost importance.”141 
2. Speech that may cause nonphysical harm 
Morse has been relied on to find support for schools regulating 
specific threats of violence, frightening imagery, and speech promoting 
 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 612. 
 136. Id. at 625. 
 137. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 422 (2007). 
 138. Miller, 588 F. Supp. 2d at 625. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 617. 
 141. Id. at 623. 
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illegal behavior. The position that there is a legitimate right to student 
speech that threatens physical harm to students (school shootings) or 
encourages physically violent and clearly illegal behavior (“hunting” 
humans) probably does not have significant support. But the bounds of 
Morse have even been read as flexible enough to extend to potential 
psychological harm to students due to the expressions of other students. 
In 2008, the Southern District of California looked to Morse in light 
of a Ninth Circuit decision rendered two years earlier, in which the issue 
was a student’s t-shirt bearing the message “‘Homosexuality is shameful. 
Romans 1:27’ on the front and ‘Be ashamed. Our school has embraced 
what God has condemned’ on the back.”142 In 2006—pre-Morse—in 
Harper v. Poway Unified School District,143 the Ninth Circuit had held 
that school administrators could regulate the wearing of such clothing 
“based on the harm it might cause to homosexual students due to its 
demeaning nature.”144 In denying the student’s motion to reconsider the 
prior grant of summary judgment in favor of the school district, the 
district court in 2008 reasoned that the Ninth Circuit’s holding was still 
constitutional in light of the then very recent Morse opinion. The district 
court said, 
[A] school’s interest in protecting homosexual students from 
harassment is a legitimate pedagogical concern that allows a school to 
restrict speech expressing damaging statements about sexual orientation 
and limiting students to expressing their views in a positive manner. 
There is no doubt in this Court’s mind that the phrase “Homosexuality 
is shameful” is disparaging of, and emotionally and psychologically 
damaging to, homosexual students and students in the midst of 
developing their sexual orientation in a ninth through twelfth grade, 
public school setting.145 
The court opined that Morse stands for the proposition that “school 
officials have a duty to protect students, as young as fourteen and fifteen 
years of age, from degrading acts or expressions that promote injury to 
the student’s physical, emotional or psychological well-being and 
development which, in turn, adversely impacts the school’s mission to 
 
 142. Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 545 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1095 (S.D. Cal. 
2008), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 318 F. App’x 540 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 143. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 549 U.S. 
1262 (2007). 
 144. Harper, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 1101 (citing Harper, 445 F.3d at 1180–81). 
 145. Id. 
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educate them.”146 
Another expansionist reading of Morse is from the Seventh Circuit, 
Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie District.147 The court here looked 
into the reasons why Morse allows prohibition of drug-related speech in 
schools and determined that one of the motivating factors was the 
psychological harm that comes by doing drugs.148 The student speech at 
issue in Nuxoll was a t-shirt worn by a student, which read “Be Happy, 
Not Gay.”149 The court invites the reader of its opinion to “[i]magine the 
psychological effects if the plaintiff wore a T-shirt on which was written 
‘blacks have lower IQs than whites’ or ‘a woman’s place is in the 
home.’”150 Nuxoll looks to Morse and Fraser and infers that if a 
particular sort of student speech can lead to a decline in student test 
scores, increased truancy, or “other symptoms of a sick school,” a school 
may consider such effects to be a “substantial disruption” which would 
justify banning that type of student speech.151 The challenged policy 
prohibited students from using any “derogatory comments . . . that refer 
to race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or disability.”152 In 
seeking to protect students from harmful words dealing with “highly 
sensitive personal identity characteristics,” the court reasoned that the 
school was merely doing its part to maintain civility and an environment 
in which student learning could flourish.153 And pointing again to Morse 
and Fraser, the court noted that effects-based analyses have led to the 
censoring of student speech that promotes other effects aside from 
violence.154 The court further reasoned that Morse and Fraser do not 
require a causal link between the speech at issue and the sort of harmful 
behavior the school seeks to prevent.155 The court noted that the purpose 
of children going to school is to receive academic instruction from adult 
faculty, “rather than to practice attacking each other with wounding 
words, and [that] school authorities have a protective relationship and 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. 523 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 148. Id. at 674. 
 149. Id. at 670. 
 150. Id. at 674. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. (emphasis added). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
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responsibility to all the students.”156 Accordingly, the court opined that 
the school rule banning derogatory remarks on the aforementioned bases 
satisfies the relevant legal tests.157 With such varying degrees of 
uncomfortable speech being regulated under these new readings of 
Morse, school administrators have not been able to look to a single 
accepted standard over the last five years. 
IV. DEVISING A CONSISTENT STANDARD 
From the sampling of cases cited above, it is surely clear that there is 
no nationwide consensus on how to address school speech in a post-
Morse world. The Supreme Court has not heard any other student-speech 
cases since Morse, leaving interpretation of the new standard to the 
appellate circuits and the states. With half a decade of case law under its 
belt now, Morse seems more mysterious than ever before. Justice 
Thomas, in his concurrence in Morse, stated that the Court’s decisions 
over the years (including Morse) are best summarized by stating that 
“students have a right to speak in schools except when they do not.”158 
Justice Thomas joined the Court’s opinion and wrote a separate 
concurrence for the purpose of chipping away at the Tinker analysis, 
arguing that the Constitution does not contain any protections for school 
speech at all.159 But we need not go quite to that extreme to 
appropriately deal with controversial student speech in a post-Columbine 
world. At the same time, it would be unwieldy and unwise to expect the 
schools to step in and hand down official disciplinary action every time 
another student’s feelings were hurt by something said, written, or worn. 
So how should schools manage speech issues? 
As a starting point, political speech must be held sacred and 
inviolate, for certain. Tinker suggested this,160 and Justices Alito’s and 
Kennedy’s concurrence in Morse agreed.161 A functional democratic 
society requires that its voters be able to understand multiple sides to 
 
 156. Id. at 675. 
 157. Id. at 674–75. While the school’s policy against derogatory speech was found to be 
acceptable, in part because of Morse and Fraser, the circuit court held that the school had not 
demonstrated that the student’s “Be Happy, Not Gay” t-shirt had actually crossed into territory 
regulated by that rule. Id. at 676. 
 158. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 418 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 159. Id. at 419. 
 160. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513–14 (1969). 
 161. Morse, 551 U.S. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring). 
SCHOEDEL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2013 2:58 PM 
1633 Morse v. Frederick: Tinkering with School Speech 
 1657 
political issues. The obvious way to ensure this happens is for people to 
gain exposure to various viewpoints through a variety of forums. Many 
high school seniors are constitutionally eligible to vote,162 and it would 
seem untenable that such students should be expected to vote 
intelligently if they are not able to learn about current political issues 
prior to walking into the polling booth. High school civics and 
government classes teach students that participation in the democratic 
process is a celebrated virtue of the American civic experience. But how 
can students be expected to participate without being equipped with the 
knowledge to do so? Lively and informed debate is surely a necessary 
component of the political participation of high school students and other 
young adults. It is not unreasonable to expect that cafeteria and hallway 
conversations, research papers, classroom debates, school newspapers, 
and other in-school opportunities to engage in discussion will continue to 
be the primary means by which students gain understanding of 
everything from popular culture to politics. The ability of students to 
share their political opinions and civilly debate the issues must remain 
protected; else, schools are in danger of turning into little more than 
indoctrination centers for the political party or administration in power at 
any given time. Indeed, Justice Alito seemed to recognize this danger: 
The “educational mission” of the public schools is defined by the 
elected and appointed public officials with authority over the schools 
and by the school administrators and faculty. As a result, some public 
schools have defined their educational missions as including the 
inculcation of whatever political and social views are held by the 
members of these groups.163 
To ensure that children are not simply herded into the same mindset 
promoted by overly politicized “educational missions,” any proposed 
standard must not infringe on students’ rights to express political 
viewpoints. Attempts to regulate school speech must not be limited to 
allowing only that school speech which agrees with administrators or 
their “educational mission.” Justice Stevens, in his dissent in Morse, 
expressed great concern that political speech in schools should receive 
the most protection: 
Even in high school, a rule that permits only one point of view to be 
 
 162. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. 
 163. Morse, 551 U.S. at 423 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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expressed is less likely to produce correct answers than the open 
discussion of countervailing views. In the national debate about a 
serious issue, it is the expression of the minority’s viewpoint that most 
demands the protection of the First Amendment.164 
Therefore, a workable proposal would limit Morse’s application in a 
way that allows for a full range of expression by students, limited only as 
follows: 
 Tinker’s exception for material and substantial disruption to 
the school; 
 Fraser’s exception for lewd and indecent speech, which also 
may have the effect of causing a disruption to the educational 
environment; 
 Kuhlmeier’s exception for speech that bears the imprimatur of 
the school; 
 Morse’s exception for speech that leads to violence or other 
serious harm to students, based on Justice Alito’s concerns 
that “schools can be places of special danger” and that “due to 
the special features of the school  
 
environment, school officials must have greater authority to 
intervene before speech leads to violence”165; and lastly, 
 Where the speech involves something other than the 
promotion of illegal drugs, an interpretation of the 
questionable speech in light of the defining characteristics of 
“fighting words.” The fighting words doctrine has been 
recognized by the Court since 1942 and has been described as 
stating that there is no First Amendment protection for speech 
that uses words “directed at individuals so as to ‘by their very 
utterance inflict injury.’”166 
Whether we consider the terrorist hunting t-shirt, the third-grade 
pictures of blowing up the school, the pseudo-Nazi students who want to 
kill minorities, or the supposed daydream about the student shooting her 
math teacher, all of these examples of student speech would meet the full 
definition of “fighting words,” in that they contain “no essential part of 
 
 164. Id. at 448 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 165. Id. at 424–25 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 166. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 432 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to 
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly 
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”167 Over the past 
seven decades, the fighting-words standard has worked outside of the 
school context to allow for freedom of expression in public forums 
while, at the same time, permitting regulation of speech that can 
reasonably be expected to either promote violence or incite a violent 
reaction from its target. 
Attire, including t-shirts, is a popular medium for expression168 and 
seems frequently to be the star of constitutional speech litigation, as this 
Comment has shown. Looking then at possible applications of the 
proposed rule, t-shirt slogans that seek to influence public attitudes 
regarding sexuality (“Be Happy, Not Gay” or “Being Gay is Being 
Happy”) would probably be permissible, but speech that attacks or 
purposely belittles individuals who are homosexual (e.g., “Gays are 
going to hell”) or Christian (e.g., “Homophobes are going to hell”) would 
likely not pass the test for allowable school speech. Similarly, a student 
who wears a t-shirt critical of religion (e.g., “There is no god and Darwin 
is his prophet” or “Thank God I’m an Atheist”) or critical of a certain 
industry (e.g., “Save the Trees”) would be protected, whilst a student 
wearing a t-shirt calling for violence against others (e.g., “Christians 
should be crucified” or “Loggers should be sawed down”) would 
properly invite school disciplinary action.169 
As another example, student speech such as the buttons comparing 
school uniforms to the Hitler Youth would find no basis for being 
banned, as it is clearly targeted toward an administrative policy, and it is 
not likely that any individual seeing the button would feel as if they were 
being personally singled out for hateful speech. But students wearing 
buttons suggesting that a revival of the Hitler Youth would be good for 
their school could certainly be censured under the proposed rule, given 
the anti-social and thinly veiled violent meaning that will easily be 
inferred by any reader of such a button. 
In each of the potential scenarios described above, the difference 
 
 167. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
 168. The legitimacy of First Amendment protection for speech through one’s attire was tested 
in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), which found that a jacket bearing a message that was 
crudely derisive of the military draft was permissible speech. 
 169. The slogans envisioned in these example shirts either have been invented by this author 
for illustrative purposes or have been seen by the author on existing bumper stickers or shirts. 
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may at first seem subtle. A hybrid content–effects test, as Morse permits, 
allows for the interpretation of the words and a consideration of what 
effects a reasonable interpretation may have on others. There is little 
likelihood that an individual who disagrees with the allowable shirt will 
see it as a personally targeted offense and therefore feel the need to be 
fearful or defensive. However, the disallowed shirt would clearly give 
the targeted individual cause to fear that the wearer might legitimately 
want to see the targeted person harmed and could provoke the targeted 
individual’s instinct to defend him- or herself from the possibility of 
violence. In the context of student writings, a diary containing specific 
plans to shoot a teacher or blow up a school would obviously cause the 
targeted persons to fear for their safety, while not advancing any 
ideological point at all on behalf of the author of the violent material. On 
the other hand, a student’s fictional story about a revolutionary force that 
fights against the government to achieve its political goals would 
probably not meet the test for what would be banned under a Morse-style 
rule tempered by the fighting words analysis. 
The primary advantage of the proposed rule is to interpret the current 
four-part Supreme Court canon on school speech in such a way that all 
legitimately useful school speech is protected, while still allowing for 
suppression of speech that either threatens actual violence or which could 
reasonably be expected to result in violence or harm to others. It is true 
that the proposed rule may not perfectly fit every conceivable case that 
could arise, yet it hews to solid free-speech principles. The scope of the 
proposed rule is broad enough to be useful to school administrators, yet 
not overly broad so as to fail to provide students notice of what sorts of 
speech could clearly be prohibited. As an example, application of the 
proposed rule would allow school administrators to take action not only 
when violent acts of a general nature are promoted (such as shootings or 
bombings), but also when speech is bullying toward an individual hearer 
of the speech. Kevin Jennings, the U.S. Department of Education’s Safe 
Schools Czar, has stated, “When . . . harassment [is] based on sex or race 
or ability, we can intervene. But on other issues, there actually is no 
national policy or no national law.”170 Combining the analysis of content 
with the reasonably expected effects on the hearer, a policy such as the 
 
 170. Jim Dubreuil & Eamon McNiff, Bullied to Death in America’s Schools, ABC NEWS (Oct. 
15, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/2020/TheLaw/school-bullying-epidemic-turning-deadly/story?id= 
11880841. 
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one proposed would allow schools to take greater action in response to 
the severest forms of school bullying even when the student does not fit 
into a protected class. With bullying a prominent subject at present, 
having attracted attention from most state legislatures and the U.S. 
Department of Education,171 the proposed policy would be another legal 
tool that could provide support for administrators and families dealing 
with severe issues of bullying in their schools. 
The primary disadvantage of the proposed rule is that certain types of 
offensive speech would obviously be permitted. But such is the case with 
free speech outside of schools as well. In a nation where the First 
Amendment protects video depictions of animal cruelty172 and funeral 
protesters carrying signs with such antisocial messages as “God Hates 
Fags” and “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,”173 some level of offensive 
speech will continue to exist in schools as well. This is a necessary 
byproduct of any free society’s protection of speech. Where the contents 
of speech are clearly offensive but the plausible effects non-existent or 
non-serious in nature, certain speech that schools may wish to regulate 
would actually find protection. For example, the wearer of the “Be 
Happy, Not Gay” t-shirt found Seventh Circuit support, even though the 
policy by which the school sought to regulate the shirt was also held to 
be acceptable. Speech using words that are ambiguous or varied in 
meaning might fall through a similar “crack” under the proposed rule. 
The Court has long recognized that “the fact that society may find speech 
offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it.”174 Even given an 
audience comprised primarily of minors, the principle remains that 
students cannot be shielded from everything that might be offensive. 
This disadvantage is offset, however, by the fact that Fraser and 
Kuhlmeier created reasonable limits that allow schools to shield younger 
students from material that could be interpreted as inappropriate. Thus, 
the danger of schools not being able to regulate “the worst of the worst” 
is quite slim. 
 
 171. See generally STOPBULLYING.GOV, http://www.stopbullying.gov (last visited Nov. 16, 
2012). See VICTORIA STUART-CASSEL ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., ANALYSIS OF STATE BULLYING 
LAWS AND POLICIES (2011), available at http://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/bullying/state-bullying-
laws/state-bullying-laws.pdf. 
 172. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010). 
 173. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213 (2011). 
 174. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The state of school speech following Morse has become something 
of a trap for the unwary school administrator and students alike. With 
varying degrees of interpretation given to the holding in Morse, 
depending on the state, district court, or federal circuit, school 
administrators cannot fashion the sort of comprehensive school speech 
policy that will best meet the needs of their school without quite possibly 
running afoul of one of the various limits imposed on the reading of 
Morse. 
On its face, Morse permits schools to limit speech that might 
reasonably be expected to promote illegal drug use among students. But 
with multiple lower courts giving Morse expansionist readings that allow 
schools to regulate speech that can either promote real violence, 
theoretical violence, psychological harm, behaviors that might lead to 
lower test scores, and a host of other harms, a clear rule is needed to 
allow students the freedom to speak their minds and grow in their ability 
to be responsible members of society. As communities become more 
pluralistic and the range of opinions held by students continues to 
diversify, legitimate speech must be protected. Likewise, as school 
violence continues to be a serious problem nationwide, school 
administrators must be afforded the tools to suppress student speech that 
can reasonably be expected to lead to violent behavior. The rule 
proposed in this Comment offers administrators the required flexibility to 
meet problems head on while likewise offering students the required 
freedom to learn, think, share, and grow in their understanding of varying 
viewpoints, even where those viewpoints may be controversial. This 
proposed rule thus helps fulfill the very purpose of education: to expand 
students’ minds, to broaden their range of experiences, and to maximize 
their exposure to new concepts that propel them ever forward. 
Ronald C. Schoedel III 
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